Crunchy Numbers: Rangers Defensive Metrics

You know the old joke about how a team wasn’t very good but they made up for it by not trying very hard? Well, I’m not accusing the Rangers of not trying hard, but while the 2008 Rangers suffered from horrible pitching, but they made up for it with wretched defense.

Earlier this month, Evan talked to John Dewan, creator of the Fielding Bible, about the chances for improved Rangers defense in 2009 and this is a follow-up or expansion on that piece.

I generally agree with Dewan that the Rangers defense should be much better in 2009, but I do see one pretty big problem (and Nolan Ryan seems to agree with me on this).

I’ll warn you before you make the leap. This pushes the envelope for baseball geekyness. Though I study this stuff, I rarely try to write about it because it’s too esoteric for most people to fight through, and that’s not exactly what we’re going for here.

But if you are interested in this stuff or if you just want to take a peek inside the brain of a truly pathetic baseball dork, then by all means make the jump.

Rangers pitchers posted the worst ERA in baseball last year, their bullpen was the most overworked, they plowed through 15 starters … yada yada yada. You know how bad it was.

What you might not fully grasp is just how much the Rangers’ turrible, turrible defense contributed to the problem.

Let’s start with the easy part and then go from there. Texas ranked twenty-sixth in runs allowed on errors. It goes without saying that in order for the defense to help the pitching, that number will have to come down. But it is a mistake to make too much of error totals in evaluating the effectiveness of a defense. A defense of nine statues who catch everything hit at them but can’t get to anything hit twelve feet away could put together an errorless season while watching balls roll to the warning track over and over again as baserunners race around the diamond at will.

The Rangers ranked last in Defensive Efficiency (0.670) last year: Defensive Efficiency, is the rate at which balls put into play are converted into outs by a team’s defense. The formula is 1 – ((Hits + Reach on Error – HR) / (PA – BB – SO – HBP – HR)) . The first part calculates the number of balls in play that do not become an out while the second part calculates the number of balls in play.

The Rangers also ranked last in MLB in Batting Average on Balls In Play (BABIP) last year at .321. BABIP is pitcher’s average on batted balls ending a plate appearance, excluding home runs. BABIP is mostly a function of a pitcher’s defense and luck, rather than persistent skill. Thus, pitchers with abnormally high or low BABIPs are good bets to see their performances regress to the mean. A typical BABIP is about .290. For the Rangers in 2008, it was .321 — meaning that a much larger percentage of balls put into play against them became hits than one would normally expect.

People often cite Tampa’s radically improved 2008 defense to account for their rapid and improbable rise from the AL East Cellar to pennant winners. These defensive metrics fully support that theory. Tampa’s BABIP was the lowest in MLB at .283 and their Defensive Efficiency rating was the best inMLB at 0.710.

I’m a believer in these numbers to an extent, but I don’t believe that they actually do precisely what they are meant to do — which is to isolate a pitcher’s effectiveness from the effectiveness of his defense.

Obviously, not all balls put in play are created equally and it’s much tougher for a defense to make a play on a screaming line drive than on a grounder, a fly ball or a popup. All are “balls in play.” Texas pitchers surrendered a higher percentage of line drives than any other staff in baseball – by a wide margin. In fact, more than 21% of the balls put in play against the Rangers were line drives. It’s much harder to make a play on a frozen rope than a grounder, popup or fly ball. And that makes outfield defense all the more important.

Individually, according to John Dewan’s plus-minus system, Nelson Cruz in right, David Murphy in left, and Marlon Byrd in left were all above-average and Brandon Boggs in left was among the best in baseball.

In center field, it’s another story. Josh Hamilton ranked 30th among MLB center fielders under John Dewan’s plus-minus system with a -13. He was (by far) the worst MLB-regular center fielder at allowing runners to take an extra base. Runners succeeded in taking an extra bag when they had the opportunity to do so .669 of the time the ball was hit to Hamilton. That figure is about .100 higher than MLB average (most regular MLB center fielders were in the .550 – .580 range while the best were in the .470 – .520 range). Only one other MLB-regular center fielder was worse than .600.

Even relatively weak-armed Willie Taveras was able to limit opposing baserunners from taking the extra base .551 of the time (and this is some evidence that getting to balls quickly is worth more for a center fielder than having a cannon arm). Baltimore’s rangy Adam Jones kept less than half from taking an extra base (.474).

And to make matters worse, Hamilton was among the worst MLB-regular center fielders at getting to balls he should have gotten to, according to Dewan’s system. According to the Fielding Bible, Taveras should have made 282 outs last year and he made 282 outs. Grady Sizemore should have made 383 outs and he made 382. Some guys actually exceeded the number of outs that they were expected to make. Based upon his opportunities, B.J. Upton had a realistic chance to make 375 outs and he made 378. Carlos Beltran helped his pitchers by turning 418 balls into outs when the Fielding Bible scouts think he should have done so only 404 times (a +14, thus he made 14 ridiculously good plays). Hamilton was a minus-5.

In the infield, everyone was putrid except Chris Davis who was solid average at first base and should only get better.

In spite of his high error totals, Ian Kinsler made more plays than he should have both on the ground and in the air due to his exceptional range (which, as Bob Sturm has documented last summer, is by far the best among MLB second basemen). What killed him was that he was terrible in making plays to his left. This could very well have been because he was playing closer to second than he should have been to compensate for Michael Young’s lack of range (especially to his left, where he has always scored poorly). If so, Kinsler could jump back into the top 10 second baseman under Dewan’s system (he was number nine in 2007) because he certainly won’t need to cheat towards second to cover up for Elvis Andrus.

Michael Young scored worse on the plus-minus than 26 other MLB-regular shortstops in 2008. He should do better as a third baseman because it is a less difficult position and due to the presence of Andrus. As I noted above, Young has scored very poorly going to his left as both a second baseman and as a shortstop. Andrus’s range to both sides and his ability to make plays in the hole could help mask what appears to be a weakness in Young’s game.

As for Andrus, I can’t quantify his defensive value. I can only tell you what I observed over the course of about 20 games last summer at Frisco. His range and arm will both be among the best of all MLB shortstops this year and that is likely to make the entire infield defense much much better. He’ll make mistakes along the way, but the kid is a fast learner and he’ll keep getting better and better for years to come.

As much as I appreciate what Josh Hamilton brings to the table — and I do — the fact of the matter is that what Nolan Ryan said in February is right:

“Hamilton has got to go to right. He’s too big to be a center fielder.”

The sooner Texas can get him out of center field, the better. Until then, his defensive limitations will seriously mitigate his overall value in spite of his tremendous offensive production.