Broxton was only the second reliever to play a major role Monday, as just hours before Yankee closer Mariano Rivera worked out of a tight spot in the bottom of the 10th of their game with Los Angeles to keep it going. After the Angels put runners on the corners with no outs, Rivera forced three straight ground outs to push the game into a second extra frame, and though the Angels ended up winning in 11 innings, Rivera’s performance is a testament to the value of having a dominant pitcher in the back of a bullpen.

To this point, the ’09 playoffs haven’t been kind to closers. Maligned Angel’s closer Brian Fuentes blew a save in the 11th inning Saturday after allowing a homer to Alex Rodriguez. One day earlier, former Ranger Chan Ho Park earned an 8th inning blown save after he gave up two runs to the Dodgers. In the postseason’s first round, Huston Street allowed a run in the 9th inning of a tied game three against the Phillies. One night later, he came into the 9th inning of game four with a 4-2 lead, and left two outs later with a 5-4 deficit. Boston’s Jonathan Pabelbon, Minnesota’s Joe Nathan, and St. Louis’ Ryan Franklin all blew two-run, 9th inning leads in their respective divisional series, leading their teams to early ousters. Through 62-9th inning outs, the equivalent of 21 innings, 15 runs scored in the ALDS and NLDS, and there have been nearly as many blown saves (9) as saves (10).

Which brings us to the Rangers. Although they didn’t quite qualify for the postseason this year, it’s hard to imagine that they wouldn’t have been contributing to the bullpen debacle had they made it in. The Rangers closer situation was an interesting one in 2009. It started about as well as anyone could have hoped — with 17.2 scoreless innings and 11 saves from Frank Francisco — but the remainder of the season was marked with injury, uncertainty, a lot of collar loosening, and plenty of brow wiping. It got so bad by season’s end that some fans were calling for rookie Neftali Feliz or soft-tossing sidearmer Darren O’Day to take over the final frame. But with Feliz likely moving back into the rotation next year, O’Day’s unproven track record, and the relative unpredictability of relievers from year to year, should the Rangers be looking to stabilize the back of their pen?

Frank Francisco and C.J. Wilson were Texas’ two closers in 2009 and, for the most part, they did a decent job. The pair combined for 39 saves, 23 holds, and eight blown saves while rotating back and forth between the closer and set-up roles. In all likelihood, they’ll be dueling it out for the same spots next year, barring some major acquisition or philosophical change.  So let’s break down the the candidates…

Frank Francisco

2009 Season

Francisco started the year on fire, rattling off 17.2 scoreless innings and converting his first 11 save opportunities before allowing an Adam Kennedy home run on May 31. He earned his 12th consecutive save on June 3 before making his second trip to the DL a week later. That’s when the wheels came off. From June 25 on, Francisco posted a 6.51 ERA and blew four saves while converting only 13. He finished the year with a 3.83 ERA and showed an unnerving tendency to implode.

The Good

Francisco has maintained excellent strikeout rates (9.95 K/9 for his career, 11.18 since 2008) and has steadily improved his control, walking a career-low 15 batters in 2009. He’s got a strong, mid-90s fastball to go with a hard curve and a good splitter, and he’s shown the confidence to throw any pitch in any count. He’s aggressive with hitters and seems to have the ability to forget about bad outings, a quality not all pitchers possess.

The Bad

Francisco is an extreme fly ball pitcher who plays in a park known to be a home run haven. For his career, his ground ball/fly ball ratio is 0.49, well below league average, and this year it reached 0.43, which was the lowest it’s been since his rookie season. Not surprisingly, this has caused a high HR/9 ratio for a closer of near 1.0, and it’s also led to a lot of extra base hits. In 2009 and 2008, Francisco allowed 40 percent and 43 percent of his total hits to go for extra bases, while the league average is 34 percent. His lack of grounders has also contributed to his forcing only one double play in 72 opportunities over the last two years. He’s not great at getting ahead of hitters and he seemed to have trouble stopping the bleeding when he struggled — in his four blown saves, Francisco allowed 15 runs in 2.2 innings.

C.J. Wilson

2009 Season

Coming off an awful 2008 campaign in which he allowed 35 runs in 46.1 innings, C.J. Wilson had a career year in ’09, setting personal bests in appearances, innings, ERA, strikeouts, and holds. Still, Wilson had his problems. Control issues led to a high walk rate and a 1.33 WHIP, which isn’t good for a reliever, and he was consistently inconsistent throughout the season.

The Good

Wilson’s got electric stuff. His fastball usually sits in the low- to mid-90s with plenty of life, though at times he cranked it up to 97 last year. His slider can disappear when he’s throwing it well, and he throws a solid changeup as well. Unlike Francisco, Wilson gets plenty of ground balls, leading to a low homer rate. He had a career high 10.26 K/9 ratio in 2009, and he dominated left-handed hitters to the tune of .206/.310/.237.

The Bad

Despite his arm, Wilson has a tendency to be too careful and not trust his stuff. Like Francisco, he struggled to get ahead in the count, and he especially struggled when facing the first batter of an outing. His walk totals, down slightly from the last two years, is still too high and put him in a lot of dangerous situations. Command is an issue, as it varies greatly from game to game, and righties can hit him fairly well. There have been questions about his maturity and whether he has the mental make up to be an effective closer.

Neftali Feliz

2009 Season

Feliz made his Major League debut in ’09, and did it in style — he struck out the first four batters he faced. Though he struggled a bit in September, he finished the season having allowed six runs in 31 innings while striking out 39. Truthfully, he’s not a closer candidate for the Rangers, at least not going into next year. But there some who think he doesn’t possess the secondary stuff to succeed as a starter, and that his ultimate role in the majors will be in the back of a bullpen.

The Good

The stuff. Feliz can hit 100 on a radar gun and make it look like a game of catch. And that’s not the best part. His fastball moves… a lot. His slurve and splitter were a pleasant surprises and he showed a fearlessness and cool that well exceed his young age. Opponents hit .124 off him with a .210 slugging percentage, and he held righties to an OPS of .274. Ridiculous.

The Bad

He’s young. He’ll turn 22 near the beginning of next season, and management didn’t seem to like the idea of pitching him more than a few times a week. His velocity was inconsistent, causing curiosity as to whether he was tiring out. Also, the Rangers seem intent on making him a starter, which is the right thing to do. With his stuff, Feliz could easily develop into a top-of-the-rotation pitcher, and getting 200 innings of Feliz annually would be much better than 60.

Outlook

There’s no doubt that the bullpen needs to be upgraded in the offseason, even if most of the changes happen internally. The middle innings became a major weak spot for the Rangers last year as Jason Jennings and Eddie Guardado showed an increasing inability to get outs and Neftali Feliz was kept on a short leash. Darren O’Day was spectacular in 2009, but it’s hard to know how he’ll perform next season. Relievers by nature are unpredictable from year to year, and pitchers with a gimmick, like O’Day’s sidearm delivery, seem especially prone to being figured out.

But the back of the bullpen shouldn’t be a major concern. Injuries really seemed to hamper what started as an excellent season for Francisco, but if he can get healthy he should be able to play out 2010 as the closer. Wilson’s inconsistency can be maddening at times, but three of his four blown saves came in the 8th inning or earlier, meaning he was 14 for 15 in 9th inning save chances. So long as he doesn’t have another year of regression like 2008, his stuff should play well in the 8th or 9th inning.

And with the price of big name closers commonly reaching eight digits a season, the Rangers simply can’t afford to chase after a Jose Valverde type this winter. Besides, the Mets, Angels, and Indians spent big money last offseason on Francisco Rodriguez, Brian Fuentes, and Kerry Wood respectively in hopes that they would solve their late-inning issues, but they’ve turned out to be busts so far.

In the final analysis, 10 pitchers started games for the Rangers this season. Kevin Millwood (31), Scott Feldman (31), Derek Holland (21), Tommy Hunter (19), Vicente Padilla (18), Brandon McCarthy (17), Matt Harrison (11), Dustin Nippert (10), Kris Benson (2), and Doug Mathis (2). This study will focus on the eight pitchers who have made at least 10 starts.

There is plenty of good news to report as they worked a significantly higher amount of innings while doing a great job at dropping the rotation’s ERA.

Both Kevin Millwood and Scott Feldman made over 30 starts with 18 Quality Starts each. That number may not blow your socks off, but those two seasons can rival pretty much any season we have seen around here by a starting pitcher in an awfully long time.

There were other signs of optimism as well, as the first year of the Nolan Ryan/Mike Maddux program seems like a perfect diving board to 2010.

Just so we are all up to speed with the different stats, IPS is Innings Per Start and PPS is Pitches Per Start. Everything else will be metrics that I am sure you are familiar with.

Before you start, we need to establish league averages for the stats so you understand what consitutes “league average”. So, here you go – These are the final American League Season Averages for the 2009 AL Season:

ERA – AL Average is 4.45
AVG – AL Average is .266
OBP – AL Average is .334
SLG – AL Average is .425
K/9 – AL Average is 6.86
BB/9 – AL Average is 3.39
HR/9 – AL Average is 1.11
WHIP – AL Average is 1.40

Below we will take apart each player and can examine how he fits against the league average:

Kevin Millwood Splits

Table Tutorial

Kevin Millwood had a very solid season by his standards, but most of his best work was done before July 1 and after September 1. He was 12 out of 16 for quality starts to start the year, and then went 6-15 the rest of the way in that all-important department. With nearly 200 innings, it is fair to ask if he pitched himself out as the season went on, and perhaps wasn’t in condition to remain at the pace he set in May and June.

But, his final numbers were mostly all better than league average. His ERA was amazing by Rangers’ standards and although he was not the most impressive pitcher on the staff down the stretch, he surely provided a bit of that anchor for the rest of the rotation for much of the year.

You could do better than Kevin Millwood, but you could also do much worse.

—————————————

Scott Feldman Splits

Table Tutorial

Feldman’s numbers are only as a Starter

The amazing success story of 2009, Scott Feldman almost matched Kevin Millwood in ERA before he hit the wall in September. His batting metrics of .245/.314/.359 blew away the league averages. He doesn’t allow base-runners, so he doesn’t get in trouble.

He also raised his often-discussed K Rate to a reasonable 5.26 per 9, so there is hope that he doesn’t apply to the Bill James anomoly rules.

17 wins were phenomenal, trailing only CC Sabathia, Justin Verlander, and Felix Hernandez. Those 3 each achieved 19, but they also had 3 more starts to get there. He appears to understand the fine art of pitching, which we have seen is not always something that can be learned.

Unlike last April, he is a lock for the rotation in 2010.

—————————————

Vicente Padilla Splits

Table Tutorial

Certainly capable of knocking your socks off in a start (NLCS Game 2), Padilla was the ultimate “Dow-Joneser” as Dick Vitale would love to say. Padilla allowed too many hits, too many runners, and his ERA and K Rate were lower than they have been.

He was the opposite of what they needed in a veteran, highly-compensated pitcher: he was undependable. As long as you never counted on anything from Padilla, he was fine. But the second you really needed him to pull through in a tough spot, he seemed to let you down. At that pay rate, and at that performance level, he was not worth the trouble.

—————————————

Derek Holland As A Starter

Table Tutorial

It is early in the Derek Holland story. He looked the part a few times this year, but for the most part, at 4 for 21 with quality starts, it was not good enough to cement his spot. He is a development project, and the Rangers will continue to hand him the ball every 5 days, but 20 more starts from now, this will not do. His ERA kept rising, his metrics were all poor (aside from K/Rate) and his worst numbers were Slugging Pct and HR Rate. Very bad combination.

Basically, when hitters make contact against Derek Holland, it generally either hits seats or off the wall it would seem. 2009 may go into the Holland book as a full learning experience, so let’s hope that we see more of what we saw that dynamite night of the trade deadline.

—————————————

Tommy Hunter Splits

Table Tutorial

Tommy makes it difficult to give Derek Holland a complete pass. Hunter is also extremely young. Hunter should have also been experiencing his growing pains, but instead he was outstanding until September. From July to August, he worked over 60 innings in 10 starts and opposing hitters barely hit over .200 against him. He actually strikes out fewer than Feldman, but like Feldman, he doesn’t allow hitters to put up the league average.

Hunter has a spot waiting for him in April, and like Feldman, I will feel pretty strong about the Tommy Hunter spot.

————————————-

Brandon McCarthy Splits

Table Tutorial

Hmmm. This is interesting. It is easy to consider McCarthy a disappointment, and because he cannot stay healthy that is not incorrect. But, when he did pitch this year (17 starts) he does have a story to tell. In September, he took the ball 6 times and opponents hit just .234/.295/.344 against him. That is a solid line. He strikes out over 6 per 9, which is 2nd only to Holland (3rd if you include Nippert). He appears to be improving, but I think patience is running out on the health issues. 2010 is likely his last year of leash on that front.

———————————-
Dustin Nippert Splits

Table Tutorial

Not sure what to make of Nippert. He went back and forth so often and these are just his numbers as a starter. He would seem to lack the ability to go deep in games, and his numbers are all right around league average except for his K/Rate. I agree with those who suggest he is an ideal swing man on a staff.

—————————————-

Matt Harrison Splits

Table Tutorial

Like McCarthy, the question is whether can he be depended upon. But, unlike McCarthy, his upside seems rather pedestrian based on his performance. In fact, that is kind. ERA over 6, under 5 K’s per 9, and the league slugs .500 against him. At this point, he is a guy.

—————————————-

Starting Rotation Totals

Table Tutorial

In the end, 68 QS out of 162 is not nearly the number we projected early. Only 2 AL teams (Oak, Balt) had fewer quality starts than the Rangers (CHI led with 86). But, with 949.2 innings, the Rangers pitched more innings than the rotations of the Yankees, Twins, A’s, Royals, Indians, and Orioles. This may not be the most impressive list, but there were years where there was no list at all. The Rangers traditionally get very few innings from their rotation in the new park era, and to get 80 more than last year supports the “1-more-out” directives.

They ranked 12th in strikeouts, with 598 strikeouts as starters, only the Orioles and Indians had fewer strikeouts. Teams like Boston and New York had almost 200 more strikeouts, so you can easily see how that places less stress on your defense and keeps runners from being moved along with contact.

Improvements were made, and because of the age of most of the rotation and the troops behind this group, the odds are reasonable that this franchise-long trend is turning in the right direction. Plenty of room for improvement, but as you learned while watching this team, pitching was not near the reason for failure that we have become accustomed to around here.

Perhaps 2010 will be even better.

Thoughts?

The reason for all the hype around Mauer is quite simple: good catchers are hard to come by, and a truly great catcher, like Mauer, can be once in a generation. Which helps to explain why only one catcher in the last 32 years — the Rangers’ own Ivan Rodriguez in 1999 — has earned an MVP award in either league (though that could  change in a month if Mauer is named A.L. MVP, as expected). It’s also why rookie catcher Matt Wieters, who the normally conservative PECOTA system pegged for a .949 OPS this year, received a standing ovation as he approached the plate for his first major league at-bat back in May.

There just aren’t many guys that can withstand six month’s worth of beatings behind the plate and still crank out a hit or two per game. So when Texas traded Gerald Laird, a solid starting catcher with two controllable years left, because they seemingly had too much catching last December, quite a few teams looked on in envy. The parting was mutual: Laird wanted a chance to be “the man” behind the plate, and the Rangers were ready to show off a deep farm system that boasted prospects like Jarrod Saltalamacchia, Taylor Teagarden, and Max Ramirez, as well as Tomas Telis, Manny Pina, and Leonel De Los Santos at the lower levels of the minors. But less than a year later, things aren’t so rosy. After a season in which none of their young catchers established themselves at the big league level, the Rangers have been left to wonder if their future backstop is even on the current roster.

Jarrod Saltalamacchia

Past

Jarrod Saltalamacchia entered the season as Laird’s heir apparent because, despite being younger than both Teagarden and Ramirez, Saltalamacchia had more than five times as many major league at-bats as the other two combined. One of the key components of the Mark Teixeira trade in 2007, Saltalamacchia was touted as a switch hitter with rare power for a catcher. In 1405 career minor league at-bats, Salty showed solid power (48 homers), a good eye (197 walks), and a slightly concerning strikeout rate (324 Ks). Though he didn’t appear to be a threat for any batting titles and his defense was still a work in progress, his 6’4″, 235 pound frame suggested that he could continue to add power to his stroke and draw 50-70 walks a year.

Present

While parts of that scouting report were visible in the 2009 version of Salty, he certainly wasn’t the player the Rangers expected this season. At the plate, he seemed to seriously regress from 2008. Some pointed to a high strikeout rate (97 Ks in 283 ABs) as a major source of his problems, but oddly, Saltalamacchia actually improved his K rate, striking out once every 2.92 at-bats versus once every 2.67 at-bats in ’08. The most obvious factors in Saltalamacchia’s offensive regression were a major drop in walks and a plummeting BAbip. Despite 85 more at-bats in 2009, Salty actually drew nine fewer walks than he did last year, failing to fluff his fledgling batting average like he did in 2008.

But the biggest culprit could be a short run of luck, as his BAbip (batting average on balls in play) dropped 65 points from last season. Batting average on balls in play is, quite simply, a player’s batting average on any ball put in play except home runs, since the defense can’t track down a ball that leaves the park. Mostly, it’s a stat that’s used to gauge if a player is getting lucky by having a lot of bloopers and dribblers fall in for base hits.

An average BAbip is about .290. In 2008, Saltalamacchia’s BAbip was .385. Not only is that high, it’s considered unsustainable, so a drop was expected and, frankly, statistically probable. This year, Salty had a BAbip of .320, which is still above average but much closer to the mean. Consequently, he saw a 20 point drop in his batting average which, combined with a lack of walks, led to a 62 point drop in on-base percentage. Some players get by with consistently high BAbip’s as a result of hitting the ball on the screws nearly every time. The aforementioned Mauer, for example, had a BAbip of .373 this season and a .344 mark for his career. But those players are the exception, not the rule that Saltalamacchia appears to be a part of.

On the bright side, Saltalamacchia took tremendous strides defensively, improving his caught stealing percentage from 18.4 percent in 2008 to 23.8 percent in 2009. That number is still below the MLB average of around 27 percent, but it’s much closer. He also reduced his errors from nine a year ago to seven this season, as well as passed balls from six to two despite logging 250 more innings behind the plate. Most importantly, his CERA (catcher’s ERA) dropped from 5.14 in ’08 to 4.08 in ’09. It’s important to note that at least a part of that decrease was due to improved defense by the Rangers, but it was obvious that he had a much better handle the pitching staff than last year.

Future

Saltalamacchia is still only 24-years-old and he showed flashes of his power potential with nine homers in 2009. He also slightly improved his strikeout ratio and took significant strides defensively, although that’s not saying much considering where he was a year ago. But, as it doesn’t appear that he’ll ever make enough contact to be a .300 hitter, Saltalamacchia’s going to have to continue to grow into his power and absolutely must increase his walk totals and cut down on the Ks. The defense, though better, was still below average in many respects. He’s a work in progress, but he’s still got plenty of tools to work with.

Taylor Teagarden

Past

When the Rangers snagged Taylor Teagarden in the 3rd round of the 2005 amateur draft, it looked like they had gotten a steal. Teagarden was widely regarded as a 1st or 2nd round talent coming out of the University of Texas, and he backed it up by mashing Northwest League pitching to the tune of .281/.426/.635 in 96 at-bats in his pro debut. After missing almost all of the 2006 season following Tommy John surgery, Teagarden continued his impressive tear through the minors by smoking the Cal League (.315/.448/.606) for 81 games, and keeping it going for double-A Frisco (.294/.357/.529) for another 29 contests. Teagarden seemed to have all of the best and worst qualities of Saltalamacchia, multiplied. He struck out 249 times in just 756 minor league at-bats, but countered that with plenty of power (43 homers) and an impeccable eye (143 walks).

Present

The problem for Teagarden was that he brought all the bad and forgot the good. In 2009, Teagarden  struck out once every 2.605 at-bats, which was just a tick worse than Chris Davis. I’ll let that sink in for a minute…

He showed decent power, but nothing particularly noteworthy, as he homered six times in 198 at-bats. He also failed to show the discipline that earned him so many walks in the minors. Teagarden had one of the lowest contact percentages in baseball, making contact with only 62 percent of the pitches he swung at last year. By contrast, Saltalamacchia had a contact percentage of 71 percent, and Michael Young was at 80 percent.

Defensively, Teagarden was much more successful than Salty at throwing out runners, owning an excellent caught stealing rate of 38.3 percent, well above league average. He did, however, have have three more passed balls and only one fewer error than Saltalamacchia in over 200 fewer innings. His CERA of 4.56 was also about half a run higher.

Future

Teagarden got the short end of the stick in many regards this year. His playing time was sparse and inconsistent, and he was assigned the unenviable task of taking on a tired, overachieving rotation when Saltalamacchia went down for the season. When he was drafted, many thought Teagarden was ML-ready defensively. Although his defense may have been better than Saltalamacchia’s in 2009, the difference was fairly negligible. And while Teagarden was never expected to be a good offensive catcher, hitting .217 and striking out 40 percent of the time obviously isn’t going to cut it. At this point, Teagarden could still turn into a solid defensive catcher with a little pop, but his offensive upside appears to be significantly limited.

Ivan Rodriguez

Past

Pudge’s past is full of goodies: 14 All-Star appearances, 13 Gold Gloves, seven Silver Sluggers, a World Series title, and an already mentioned A.L. MVP award. His more recent past, however, doesn’t look so nice. Pudge’s offensive skills have been, understandably, on the decline since mid-decade. Prior to this season, Pudge had four straight years of a sub-.800 OPS, and his .276 average last year was his lowest since 1993.

Present

The fact that Pudge laid claim to the record for most games caught in baseball history this year is a testament to his durability and toughness, but also to just what a beating his body has taken for nearly two decades. At the plate, 2009 was the worst year for Rodriguez since his second big league campaign back in 1992, posting a season .664 OPS. He was quick to rekindle old chemistry when Houston traded him to Texas, going 10 for his first 29 with 5 doubles and a homer to start his Ranger revival. But Rodriguez was dreadful the rest of the way, hitting .203 with a .515 OPS over the final month and not even playing in any of the Rangers’ last four games.

Pudge’s offensive woes were the result of a line drive percentage of 16 and a strikeout percentage of 20.5, both easily career worsts. Essentially, that means Rodriguez wasn’t putting the ball in play as much as in years past, and when he was, he was making weak contact more often. Unless there was  some major unknown injury he was battling through, both of those stats appear to be the result of age and wear, things that certainly won’t get better with time.

He’s still a threat behind the plate, throwing out 6 of 13 would-be base stealers while with the Rangers, and an excellent 35 percent overall for the season. Obviously, he’s not the defensive catcher he was ten or fifteen years ago, but even at 37, runners take heed to whose in the chest protector. His CERA was the highest of all regular Rangers catchers at 4.88, but a portion of that could be attributed to unfamiliarity and pitcher fatigue.

Future

After an ugly late-season run with the Yankees in 2008, Pudge needed an outstanding showing at the World Baseball Classic last spring just to earn a tryout with the Astros. The result was another significant step back in his production in ’09. From preliminary reports, it seems as though both sides remain interested in a possible reunion next year, presumably because Rodriguez lacks options and the Rangers remain uncertain in their catching situation. But the truth is the Rangers should be able to get out of Teagarden and Saltalamacchia what they could get out of Pudge, or at least they better hope so. And with a number of prospects becoming eligible for the Rule V draft, the Rangers might need the space on the 40-man roster.

Max Ramirez

AP Photo

Past

He’s probably one of the easiest names of the ’07 deadline haul to forget amidst guys like Saltalamacchia, Elvis Andrus, Neftali Feliz, Matt Harrison, and David Murphy. But ever since Max Ramirez first picked up a bat, all he’s done is hit. Starting with two years in rookie ball as a 19- and 20-year-old, Ramirez hit .314 with 16 homers and 50 walks in 443 at-bats. He started 2007 with the advanced-A Kinston Indians and switched to the Bakersfield Blaze mid-season after the Rangers acquired him for Kenny Lofton. But it wasn’t until 2008 that he absolutely broke out, posting a .354/.450/.646 line with 17 homers and 37 walks in just 243 at-bats during his first stint at double-A, earning a prompt promotion to triple-A Oklahoma City. Since then, however, he hasn’t quite been the same.

Present

After his call-up to Oklahoma City, Ramirez posted a .725 OPS in 10 games with the RedHawks before making the jump to the big leagues, where he posted a nearly identical .715 OPS in 17 appearances. A strong winter league showing didn’t seem to help Ramirez’s 2009 campaign, which was a struggle from the onset, marred by a wrist sprain that hampered him all season. Ramirez started out very slowly, and after a DL stint and a very brief rehab assignment in the Arizona League, he started making small progress. But his final line in ’09 was nowhere near where we’re used to seeing from him, going .234/.323/.336 with just five homers in 274 at-bats.

Defense has been a major question mark for Ramirez since his acquisition, with most experts projecting him as a DH or 1B at the ML level. Quite simply, his defense doesn’t quite stack up for a catcher by major league standards, and the Rangers have struggled to find a position that suits his glove any better. But, if he can get his bat back to where it was for Frisco in 2008, Texas would put him where ever they had to to get him at-bats.

Future

The lingering questions about his defense took a back seat to offensive concerns in 2009, but it seems a nagging wrist injury had as much to do with Ramirez’s struggles this year as anything physically or psychologically wrong with his approach. Ramirez will have a chance to return to form in 2010, but having just turned 25-years-old on October 11, he’s starting to outgrow the “prospect” label. If Ramirez can’t put it together next year, he’ll be treading dangerously close to Jason Botts territory.

So while a long offseason looms for us Dallas die-hards, the question of what key changes will be made to the Rangers roster for 2010 will likely have an answer by January. In truth, Texas doesn’t figure to throw a lot of money around on the  free agent market because, well, Tom Hicks doesn’t have it. It doesn’t help that the Rangers owe Vicente Padilla and Frank Catalanotto a couple million each to buyout their contracts, despite the fact that Cat hasn’t donned a Rangers uni in over a year and Padilla spent his Saturday pitching the Dodgers to their second straight NLCS berth (I slept until two and ate a day-old burrito. To each his own, I guess). But the Rangers supposedly aren’t looking to shed payroll, and if Evan Grant’s math is right, Jon Daniels and company could have at least a little cash to play with over the coming months.

Which brings us to Marlon Byrd.

Byrd started 100 games for the Rangers in center field this season and tallied another 41 starts in the corner outfield positions, providing much needed versatility in an outfield plagued with injuries and inconsistency. He got nearly half of his 547 at bats in prime run-producing positions, rewarding Ron Washinton’s confidence in him by posting a combined slash line of .305/.370/.554 while driving in 55 runs from the three and four spots in the order. By all accounts, he was a tremendous leader and clubhouse presence on a team rife with 20-somethings. He’s said that he wants to remain a Ranger. His teammates have spoken out about how vital his return is, with Michael Young being his most vocal supporter. Even the normally tight-lipped GM Jon Daniels, who prefers to play most things close to the vest, had this to say in a recent chat with Richard Durrett…

As we’ve told Marlon and his agent Sam Levinson, we’d like to have him back. Now it comes down to what fits for us financially, given the makeup of this team, and what he feels he’d accept. We’re not at the point just yet of exchanging specifics #s but we probably will be soon. If he’s not back, we have quality depth in the OF and we’ll also pursue alternatives via trade/FA.

It seems all parties want to get a deal done. So what’s the problem? At 32-years-old, Byrd is running out of time to really cash in on his playing career.  Sure, he’s earned about $5 million in the last two years, which is more than most people see in a lifetime. But that’s a pittance compared to what some of his peers make, and it’s what Alex Rodriguez pulled in for a month’s work this year, not including endorsements. So while Byrd and the Rangers have both said they’d like to reach an agreement, that’s no guarantee. Because talk is cheap, and Marlon Byrd won’t be.

When Byrd arrived in Arlington three years ago, he had just spent the ’05 and ’06 seasons struggling for playing time with the Washington Nationals, who, incidentally, finished last in the N.L. East both years. Byrd was 29-years-old, owned a career OPS of .692, and had been designated for assignment by one of the worst teams in baseball. After spending spring training with the Rangers, Byrd was promptly sent to triple-A in favor of guys like Brad Wilkerson and Jerry Hairston, Jr. In other words, his career was hanging by a thread.

But he got his chance in late May of 2007, and played in 109 of the Rangers’ final 116 games while posting career highs in batting average, slugging percentage, and OPS.  Prior to his stint in Texas, Byrd had never hit 10 homers, driven in 50 runs, or cracked an .800 OPS at the Major League level. He’s accomplished all three of those feats in each of his seasons as a Ranger.

So, obviously, Marlon Byrd’s been productive in Texas. He’s a gap hitter with a solid average and 10-20 home run power, putting him in the same category as quite a few well-known major leaguers. Offensively speaking, Byrd’s numbers compare to those of Randy Winn, Jose Guillen, or Alex Rios. Carl Crawford and Shane Victorino, save for the stolen base numbers, also bear a statistical resemblance and, to a lesser extent, so does Raul Ibañez. Though Ibañez’s statistics in the years leading up to his ’08 free agency were definitely superior to Byrd’s, they’re at least in the same stratosphere, and Ibañez managed to overcome the recession and land a three year, $31 million contract at the age of 36.

Then again, Bobby Abreu only managed a one year deal worth $5 million despite owning six — and now seven — straight seasons with at least 100 RBI, so who knows. But if there’s one common thread between all the aforementioned players, it’s that they make a lot more money than Marlon Byrd did last year. Jose Guillen earned $12 million with the Royals as part of a three year, $36 million contract he signed at 32-years-old, the same age Byrd is now. Carl Crawford brought in $8.2 million, Randy Winn made $9.6 million, and Alex Rios signed a six year, $64 million extension in 2008.

According to FanGraphs, Byrd accounted for 2.4 WAR, or Wins Above Replacement, which ranked him as the 21st best outfielder in the A.L. and put him in the middle of the pack.

At least financially, Byrd’s in good company. But on the down side, he ranked second to last in walk rate and dead last in BB/K ratio among all qualifying A.L. outfielders in 2009. He made some spectacular diving catches on defense, but those may have been covering up for a lack of range brought on by below-average speed in center field. While Byrd’s UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating) was 2.1 in left field and 1.6 in right field, it was an ugly -5.3 in center, a number that only figures to get worse with age.

So, if the Rangers plan on bringing Byrd back to roam center field, relieving Josh Hamilton’s weary body and giving Julio Borbon time to learn the position, they might want to think again. While Byrd seems to catch everything he gets to, he might not get to as much as he should, and the notion of sticking him in a corner outfield spot seems to defeat the purpose of bringing him back, especially with Hamilton, Borbon, David Murphy, and Nelson Cruz already available there.

All things considered, it’s hard to imagine that Byrd could land an Ibañez-type deal that pays him $10 million annually. More than likely, Byrd will get a three or four year deal that will make him $6-8 million a year. The question is, are the Rangers willing to shell out $21 million for three more years of Marlon? It’s not the type of contract that would handcuff a franchise, and with Kevin Millwood’s salary coming off the books at the end of 2010, the Rangers could conceivably add a few big contracts in the coming years without actually adding payroll in the long-term. But if Tom Hicks’ financial situation means Marlon Byrd is the only big name the Rangers can bring in for the upcoming season, is that really enough?

Byrd figures to qualify as a type-B free agent, meaning if the Rangers offer him arbitration — which they should — and Byrd politely declines it — which he should — then at the very least, Texas would be compensated with a “sandwich pick,” which, unfortunately, isn’t as delicious as it sounds. MLB compensates teams that lose type-A and type-B free agents with an extra pick that falls between the 1st and 2nd rounds of the amateur draft. Recently, the Rangers have used sandwich picks to snag Julio Borbon and former Fresno State ace Tanner Scheppers, who could be at the top of Ranger prospect sheets next year.

So, in reality, there could be some value in losing Byrd. Not only could it free up the cash to make a big splash in a greater area of need, but it would give the Rangers the means to acquire another high-profile prospect. If Hicks decides re-signing Byrd doesn’t mean the Rangers are done for the winter, or Marlon decides he’d be willing to stick around for a one or two year deal, then his return likely won’t even be an issue.

But for all the strides the Rangers made in 2009, they still finished 10 games behind the Angels in the A.L. West and eight games back of the Red Sox in the Wild Card. And while it’s truly impossible to put a value on what a guy like Byrd can bring to a clubhouse, the fact remains that the Rangers have more players that can replace the production of a Marlon Byrd than, say, a Ben Sheets, assuming he’s healthy. All we know is, come April, the Rangers will take the field again, and Marlon Byrd will be ready to show off his fat new contract. They might just have to happen in two different places.

Sunday in Tampa, the Cowboys offense put up a rare display. 462 yards is amazing. 52 plays is rare. 462 yards in 52 plays so off the charts silly that we might be wasting our time to read any meaning into it.

How crazy is 52 plays for 462 yards? 8.9 yards per play. You may never see that again, so save the tape.

Last year, the Cowboys had 2 games of more than 462 yards. Week 1 at Cleveland (488 yards in 63 snaps = 7.74 yards per play) and Week 3 at Green Bay (481 yards in 66 snaps = 7.29 per play). And, there was only 1 game in 2008 of fewer than 55 plays, which was the Win at Washington when they had 53 plays. So, yes, 52 is uncommonly few – and 462 yards is really impressive.

24 run plays/28 pass plays for the Cowboys (54% pass), and on 25 1st downs, the Cowboys ran the ball 15 times.

Now, what about my summer theories about the Cowboys stressing Multiple TE’s? I think I wrote about it 10 times, and it must have been obvious, because Jason Garrett and the Boys seem to be on the same page. In 52 snaps, 30 plays had multiple TEs, with straight “12″ personnel being the most-used package of the afternoon. It is a simple question of having either Martellus Bennett or Deon Anderson on the field. I think it a generally an easy choice.

Perhaps most shocking of those 12 plays they played in “12″ is that they opted to pass 11 times. I think this is baiting future opponents, because I expect this will be close to a 50/50 split from this look during the year. Not sure if it will be the Giants, but I bet a future opponent is going to be thinking pass (maybe even bring in another DB) and the Cowboys will start using that 7 man Offensive Line to push people around in front of Barber. On the other hand, Romo threw 11 passes from this set for 194 yards (17.6 per att!!!) so maybe they can do whatever they want – which was my dream this summer in the first place.

Totals by Personnel Groups:

Table Tutorial

Definition of the Personnel Groups, click here .

A few more things about Jason Garrett’s personnel packages: Let’s Define “Other” from the chart above; This week, he ran 3 groups 1 time each. On the 2nd play of the game, he ran out shotgun with 0 RBs, 1 TE, and 4 WRs = “S01″; Then, he had the Cowboys version of the “Wildcat” for 1 play, and in the 2nd half, he had a 3rd down package “S20″ which featured 2 RBs, 0 TEs, and 3 WRs. None of them were productive, other than the idea that future opponents will now have to study and consider each of those looks.

The other thing that I have learned in these last few years of my psychotic studying of Garrett’s trends is that he never falls into a pattern. He substitutes EVERY play (other than the 2 minute drill). Trust me, he does not have the same personnel Group on the field for 2 straight plays except on rare occasions. On Sunday, it took 45 plays for the Cowboys to run consecutive plays in their base offense with the same look. And, you could easily say that by that point of the game (late 4th Quarter) the Cowboys had iced away the contest and were merely trying to kill the clock.

Big Plays:

#1 – 4th Q – 2/9/D20 – IN “12″, Pass to Crayton, 80 yards for Touchdown
#2 – 3rd Q – 2/10/D34 – In “S12″, Pass to Williams, 66 yards for Touchdown
#3 – 4th Q – 1/10/D36 – In “12″, Pass to Crayton, 44 yards for First Down
#4 – 2nd Q – 1/10/T42 – In “S11″, Pass to Austin, 42 yards for Touchdown

So, 4 huge plays, and 3 come with some variation of “12″. It is clear that match-ups cause confusion on defense. Confusion leads to open receivers. And open receivers lead to yards in bunches.

I am very excited to add video to my breakdowns this year, courtesy of Brian at DC Fanatic.com and I greatly appreciate his technical abilities and willingness to assist in trying to break this stuff down. Please go visit him when you can.

Let’s look at a few plays a bit closer to see what they are doing. I encourage you when you check out the videos to pause it prior to the snap to observe the formation/personnel:

66 Yard TD to Roy Williams:

Here, we have Shotgun “12″. Bennett is wide left, Witten is wide right. Tampa Bay puts corners on both Cowboys Tight Ends, I assume because they are lined up as the “widest receivers”. Meanwhile, Crayton is in the slot by Witten on the right, Williams is in the slot on the left. In pre snap, Williams comes in motion over to the right side by Crayton, and now you have 2 “speed” WRs in the right slot, with nothing but LBs and Safeties to contend with. 82 and 80 run 10 yard routes and stop. Crayton drags across the field 5 yards downfield, and Williams runs right down the seam. You can see early on that Ronde Barber (#20 – who is lined up with Witten) sees this is very bad and tries to go help on Williams, but it is too late. Candy from babies here, and you can bet the Giants are really trying to figure out what they will do differently.

44-yard to Crayton:

Also, in “12″, but with Romo under center. TEs 80 and 82 are lined up tight with the tackles and will assist in pass protection (Martellus does a great job keeping a blitzing LB off Romo). Barber is deep behind Romo, and each WR is lined up rather close to the OL. I have to think in the presnap, TB is looking run here. This is the beauty of “12″. What do you do if you are a safety and you see a 7 man OL with Barber deep? You have to be tempted to sneak up. And that is where play action can kill you. Romo offers a play action fake to Barber who heads to the right flat. Once the 6-man rush doesn’t get there (with a 7th man hitting Romo as he throws) the Bucs are in trouble if either Crayton or Williams can get open. Crayton does and it is an easy 44 yards.

80 Yard TD to Crayton

Crayton Wide Right, Witten Slot Right, Williams Slot Left, Bennett Wide Left. “12″ with Felix Jones deep. The risk here is having enough guys to protect and giving Romo a chance to get the pass off. 5 OL + Felix trying to keep 5 rushers of Romo was not an easy task, but Romo got the pass away. Once the safety took a step to Witten in the flat, Crayton was gone. Again, when it works, it looks so easy.

UPDATE: I forgot to mention something a few of you have pointed out.  Notice the key to the safety stepping to Witten is the solid pump fake from Romo.  Nothing freezes DBs better than a well-executed pump, and Romo deserves to be recognized for that.

Austin 42 yard TD

Boys are in their base 2 minute offense, “S11″. This has Barber and Witten staying in to protect in a 7 man protection scheme. Austin to the far right, Williams the far left, and Crayton in the slot on the left. Elbert Mack is pressing Austin at the line, and honestly, it looks like reasonable coverage to me. But a nice throw and an amazing catch and run by Austin gets the ball in the end zone.

And then the play that I was so excited about yesterday:

Barber’s 6 yard TD Run

From Yesterday’s Game Notes :

The Cowboys are in “13″ personnel (1 RB, 3 TEs) and are at the 6 yardline. 2 TEs (82, 80) are on the offensive right. John Phillips (88) is lined up as a FB offset to the right. Tampa sees this huge overload and they adjust the defense accordingly. Then, at the snap, Phillips heads right behind Witten to the right. At the same moment, the Left Guard (Kosier – 63) pulls to the right edge. Every single Cowboy is selling that this play is going to the right. Watch the Tampa Linebackers and safeties at the snap – they are following their keys. Key on the lead blocker. Key on the pulling guard. Almost everyone is running towards that edge where the Cowboys are all deployed. One problem. Romo flips it to Barber who heads to the Left. He doesn’t follow any of his blockers. And the play is so well executed that Barber is to the 1 before he has to do anything but stroll into the endzone. Roy Williams helped at the end with a block, but it was a total shock to the defense. I love it. Genius stuff. You have to go back and watch that play if you get the chance.

Brian put a key piece of audio on here that has Patrick Crayton explaining that the offense did not know any of this! Funny stuff.

Target Distribution:

I think it is important to find out where Romo is going with the ball every week. One practical application is just to help you win debates with your buddy. When the topic turns to “Who is the Cowboys #1 WR?”, you can merely show them (I assume the evidence will bear itself out again) that the #1 target is not a WR at all. It is Jason Witten. In the last 33 games (32 of which Terrell Owens was a Cowboy), Witten has 32 more catches than any other player (182 for Witten, 150 for Owens) and only 239 fewer yards than Owens. If you divide that by the 32 games, that means Owens accounted for less than 8 more yards per game than Jason Witten. Losing Owens doesn’t mean they don’t have a #1 receiver. It simply means they have a TE as a #1 WR.

Sunday, Jason Witten caught 5 passes. 4 went for 1st downs, and the 5th pass was on 1st and 10 when Witten only gained 9 yards. He remains money.

Table Tutorial

3rd Down Target Distribution:

And to further pound home the point of Witten’s dominance, you must study 3rd down targets. After 1 game, there is no sample size worth noting. But, watch during the season to see that #9 trusts #82 on the most important down. This is just the start.

Table Tutorial

SACKS

All season long, I want to focus on Cowboys pass protection (since it was such an issue last year in December). So, this chart may help us assign blame on sacks and see who is leaking. The trouble is, some sacks are tough to tell who blew it. For instance, the Ronde Barber sack on Sunday during the 1st drive has me wondering if that was just a case of a corner blitzer coming free and Romo has to see it or he is dead. Sometimes, on a blitz like that, the defense outsmarted you.

UPDATE: I talked with 2 people in the know this morning, and both tell me Martellus had his right assignment on the blitz. Both guys told me that the credit goes to Tampa DC Jim Bates for calling a perfect blitz on a play the Cowboys were running to the left. The blindside blitz from the right was just the right call. Blame? Maybe Romo, maybe nobody.

Anyway, we will continue to update this chart as the season goes on:

Table Tutorial

More Game Highlights

In the 129 games that were played before the calendar turned to September, 9 pitchers have started games for the Rangers. Kevin Millwood (26), Scott Feldman (24), Derek Holland (16), Tommy Hunter (12), Matt Harrison (11), Brandon McCarthy (11), Dustin Nippert (7), Kris Benson (2), and Doug Mathis (2). This study will focus on the six pitchers who have made at least 10 starts. The other 3 run into sample size issues that might render verdicts a bit meaningless.

Proceed at your own risk – for stat nerds only:

Just so we are all up to speed with the different stats, IPS is Innings Per Start and PPS is Pitches Per Start. Everything else will be metrics that I am sure you are familiar with.

Before you start, we need to establish league averages for the stats so you understand what consitutes “league average”. So, here you go:

ERA – AL Average is 4.46
AVG – AL Average is .265
OBP – AL Average is .333
SLG – AL Average is .426
K/9 – AL Average is 6.87
BB/9 – AL Average is 3.37
HR/9 – AL Average is 1.13
WHIP – AL Average is 1.40

Kevin Millwood Splits

Table Tutorial

Is your Millwood cup half-full or half-empty? If you are a positive person, you can say that he has easily been the Rangers most durable and dependable starter. If you are a negative person, you can easily suggest that July and August have been his two weakest months – and the results are not even close. With just 3 Quality starts since July 1, and the league slugging .475 off him in those two months, it is fair to say Millwood has gone from dominating early, to “below average” late.

Still, all in all, 32 starts – 200+ innings, and an ERA under 4? I think 2009 for Kevin Millwood has been absolutely acceptable.

Scott Feldman Splits

Table Tutorial

You would lose a lot of money betting against Scott Feldman. He has been such a riduclous story of success that it is almost difficult to pour over the numbers. His Avg/OBP/Slug splits are all well below league averages. I cannot remember a Ranger pitcher that can say that in recent years. His WHIP has been low all season long and although his walks are slowly rising, they are still plenty low.

One curious point of Feldman is his K/9 rate in August. Given my obsession on the topic on July 29, it is amazing that he doubled his K rate in August. Is it a anamoly? Is it proof Feldman reads Inside Corner? Whatever the case, suddenly, he strikes guys out.

Since becoming a starter, Feldman has not had a month of fewer than 3 Quality Starts. Simply put, Scott Feldman has been unreal. All year.

Vicente Padilla Splits

Table Tutorial

And so, the Vicente Padilla era ends in Texas. Moments of brilliance early in the season, but like Millwood, it appears that as the season developed, Padilla’s best moments were fewer and further between. Only 24 innings since July 1, and in those games the league was hitting .320 off of him.

I believe they suggest that you can grow fungus on your shower shoes if you can win 20 in the show. But, if the league is hitting .320 off of you, you better be a good teammate.

Derek Holland As A Starter

Table Tutorial

Please keep in mind, all of these Holland numbers are as a starter-only. He has had a rough go of things, with 4 Quality Starts in 16 tries. His K/9 Rate is out of this world but so is his HR/9 Rate.

He clearly has learned some tough lessons this year. He has shown flashes, but to simply claim it is a young pitcher learning the ropes is partly true – but it also ignores Tommy Hunter’s year.

Tommy Hunter Splits

Table Tutorial

The Tommy Hunter numbers do not include his first 2 starts in June, but the numbers are shocking all around. Hunter has simply exceeded expectations on every level and every stat. He allows no runners, no home runs, no extra base hits, no nothing. He works into the 7th inning. He has given the Rangers 70 innings already and has almost no disaster starts.

If Feldman has been the biggest surprise, then Hunter is right behind him. As Holland and Feliz steal the headlines, Tommy Hunter is knocking them dead without a ton of fanfare. He has really been good.

Brandon McCarthy Splits

Table Tutorial

McCarthy’s start last night did not make the August sample, so check back next month to see how his return went.

Matt Harrison Splits

Table Tutorial

Harrison has been shut down for the year.  His 2009 will not be long remembered.

Starting Rotation Totals

Table Tutorial

In June, I wrote this:

Only 3 teams in the major leagues (Balt, Wash, Pitt) have fewer strikeouts from their rotations, but only 1 team is getting more pitches (Boston) per start from that same rotation. The Rangers starters are giving their team 6 innings and 99.3 pitcher per start and a Quality Start on 47% of their occasions. This is keeping the bullpen reasonably fresh, and the team is staying quite competitive.

The Rangers are ranked 12th in MLB and 6th in the American League right now in Innings Pitched by its Starting Rotation. The Rangers are getting Quality Starts on 45% of their opportunities. The Rangers are 21st in the MLB in this category. But, the most remarkable number on September 1st? With a Staff ERA of 4.40, only 3 American League teams have better starting rotation ERA; Seattle (4.04), Detroit (4.29), and Chicago (4.33). 4th in the American League? Believe it. It is true.

That makes me giggle.

Anyway, he wrote an essay this week that I wanted to share with you. It is all about the strides the Rangers havemade this season in the defensive department. I am not going to lie to you, this might be a bit deeper than some would like to go – given the enormous amount of Bill James-type statistics he uses, but if you enjoy that sort of data analysis, then you very much might enjoy this.

TC the intern looks at why the Rangers are better in 2009. It is all about the gloves:

These Rangers have been able to finally cash in the promise past teams never delivered on because the organization has finally stopped focusing entirely on bats and started to give credence to pitching and defense. I get the impression that most folks hold that sentiment about the 2009 Rangers (I get this impression mainly from Norm’s call with Dwight in North Dallas). This view of the situation is only half right: the Rangers have made astounding leaps in their defense, some really incredible stuff. However, the pitching—especially the starting pitching—is not terribly different from last year. They’re better, but only by a little. In the rush to find a nice, clean reason for the fact the Rangers have a lot more wins than last year, I don’t feel like there’s being an adequate separation being made between the contributions of the pitching staff and the contribution of the team’s gloves. I would like to use this forum to demonstrate such a separation.

Now, if you’re the sort of fella who likes baseball but doesn’t have time for too many numbers, then just trust me on this one: just about nothing has changed with the pitching staff. The pitchers are pitching the same. It’s just that the guys behind those pitchers are covering for their hurlers much better than in years past. The Rangers have a defense that is top five in the major leagues (closer to five than one, but still, top five).

But if you are the sort of fella who likes baseball and can tolerate a little stat analysis, then I think you might like these next five minutes of your life.

And if you’re not the sort of fella who likes baseball, you must be pretty frustrated with this blog.

In 2008, the Rangers allowed 5.96 runs per game. In 2009, the Rangers have allowed 4.41 runs per game. The two elements to run prevention are pitching and defense (and luck, but I’ll throw in a word about that at the end). So if we show, as I’m about to, that the pitching is pretty damn similar to last year, then the defense must hold the majority of responsibility for that difference in runs allowed. That’s not all my “the defense is so awesome now” is resting on, but that’s a good bit of it.

It’s been demonstrated with math and stuff that a pitcher has real control over three things: getting strikeouts, preventing walks, and keeping the ball on the ground when contact is made. These three things can be wrapped up in one nice little number: Fielding-Independent Pitching (FIP). It’s on the same scale as ERA, but it only takes into account strikeouts, walks and home runs allowed (if you’re keeping the ball on the ground, it’s not going to go out of the park). In 2008, the Rangers had an FIP of 5.37, good for 28th in the major leagues. This year, the Rangers have had an FIP of 4.58. You would definitely take that number over 5.37, but they’re still 24th in the league. Taking home runs out of the picture since the Ballpark has quite an impact on that, the Rangers ranked 28th last year in strikeout-to-walk ratio and have improved on that as well, but again only to 24th. Those numbers and many others show that the Rangers had one of the three worst pitching staffs in the majors in 2008, and while they have universally improved in pitching categories, it’s still one of the five or so worst staffs in the majors. Those jumps don’t even begin to explain how a team would allow more than a full run less per game.

What does explain the jump, however, is the defense. There are a number of categories one looks at to see if factors a pitcher has no control over are making him look better than he really is. A lot of the time, those factors are the result of luck. When an entire pitching staff all has ‘luck’ in all the same categories, you should probably look for a better explanation.

Two such categories are Batting Average on Balls In Play (BABIP) and Percentage of Runners Left on Base (LOB %). BABIP is just looking at of the times batters make contact, how many times does that contact end up in a hit. When watching baseball, we all see times that a ball is hit hard, certainly hard enough to turn into a hit in most cases, but happens to go right into someone’s glove. The pitcher has made a mistake in those situations, allowing hard contact, but he was not punished for it for reasons outside his own accomplishments. So BABIP is a way of correcting for that. But when you look past one pitcher and look at a whole staff, BABIP becomes a way of approximating the contributions of the fielders: are they just getting to so many balls and making the right throws and such that they can be depended upon to prevent contact from turning into hits on a game-to-game basis? A low BABIP (usually defined as one less than .300) is luck on the part of the pitcher, but it can still be an accomplishment of the fielders behind him.

The other number, LOB%, is similar. Say one pitcher allows three singles in two innings, and they happen to occur in such a way as to allow none of the runners to score, and another pitcher allows three singles in two innings, but they occur in such a way that two runs score. The biggest difference between these two performances is chance. Yes, the first pitcher might have done a better job of pitching from the stretch, but still: the majority of the single factor most responsible for one guy succeeding and another failing has nothing to do with their own performance, it’s chance. LOB% accounts for that. It’s a way of checking if someone has had abnormally good luck at having the runners he allows not coming around to score. Some of this has to do with pitching well: if you allow a runner, but are the sort of dominant guy that can just strike out the next three to strand that runner, bully for you. But the biggest factor in a single pitcher having a low or high LOB% is luck. However, it’s again different if an entire pitching staff has a high LOB%. Then, those runners might be getting stranded because the defense is so good at turning everything into an out. Suddenly it’s hard for runners to come around to score because contact that would normally be good enough to move a runner over is now being caught, or a fly ball that would normally be a sac fly isn’t because a runner respects the outfielder’s arm. These things pile up, and thanks to that, a team’s LOB% can make some commentary on a team’s fielding ability.

A short aside: the performance of just about every pitcher in the starting rotation has been aided by these numbers. Just about everyone is looking better than they’re pitching. But there is one very exciting exception: Derek Holland. Of the seven pitchers who have spent appreciable time in the starting rotation, Holland is one of only two to have a BABIP over .300 (.332). Further, he has a homerun-to-flyball ratio of 14.6%. That’s plain bad luck; he can expect that to fall to around 11% with time. Once it does, he will havea 4.21 FIP. That figure won’t win any Cy Young’s, but it would be the best number in the rotation. Again, for emphasis: Derek Holland is pitching better than anyone in the starting rotation. And he’s 22. If you want reason to hope that the pitching might one day undergo the sort of turnaround that I’m about to illustrate the defense has, there’s your source of hope. And what’s more is that Holland still has clear room to grow: he is currently striking out about seven and a half batters per nine. In his minor league career above AA, he was striking out 10.2 batters per nine, so you can feel a good bit of confidence that he’ll start improving on those K’s pretty soon, though he’s already pretty good at it. Once you get past the unlucky BABIP and HR/FB, you have to be really excited about Holland. We’ve heard he has ace potential. That’s not a lock based on these numbers, but it’s clearly within the realm of possibility.

Both of these numbers, however, give more of a rough outline of defense rather than a clear picture. One number that tries to give such a picture is Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR). Despite the name, it looks at all aspects of a fielder’s defense and puts a number, measured in runs, of how much that fielder’s defense is worth. Sports Illustrated wrote a very nice article about it before the season explaining everything in full.

Another little spice to add to this stew is that of FIP-ERA. That’s just what it looks like: the difference one gets when subtracting the FIP from the ERA. If FIP is a measure of what a pitching staff is doing, and ERA is the actual number of earned runs that occurred, it stands to reason that the difference between the two is a nice mix of the defense’s contribution and pure chance.

Using these four things—BABIP, LD%, UZR, and FIP-ERA—together can give us a real nice idea of just how much the Rangers fielding has improved. In 2008, the Rangers ranked dead last in every single one of those categories. While each of these elements separately can be doubted, when taken together, there can be no doubt this was the worst defense in the major leagues, and it might not have been close. This is probably a separate post, but the 2008 Rangers may well have been historical in how terrible they were. The single most damning thing was a -51.7 UZR. Roughly speaking 10 runs is worth about one win. The Rangers gave up five wins that they would have received had they been merely average as a defensive team. A good many division races are decided by fewer than five wins. Truly remarkable stuff.

2009, however, is equally remarkable for the tremendous improvements made. The Rangers rank 4th in BABIP at .288, 4th in LOB% at 74%, 3rd in FIP-ERA at -0.40, and—here’s the real crown jewel—5th in UZR with 24.7 runs. So with more than 50 games remaining in the season, the Rangers have already gained another seven (!!!) wins going by UZR. What was the worst defense in the MLB is now cemented a place in the top five. That kind of turnaround is going to bring you a lot of success.

This defensive improvement is really pretty magical, and I think that warrants a closer look at some of the specific personnel upgrades the Rangers made. The largest improvement is probably the most obvious: Elvis. I know we all like Michael Young, me included, but UZR does not rate him highly at all as a defensive shortstop. He was five runs below average as a defender in 2008, and it was actually one of his better years. Compare that to Andrus, who has the third highest UZR among shortstops at 11 despite being the youngest regular in the majors. You gotta feel good about him as something to build around defensively.

Many observers have credited Ian Kinsler as improving his gloveworkthis year compared to his first few in the majors. UZR supports this: though he is about seven runs below average for his career, he is fiveand a half runs above average thus far in 2009. The way UZR works, it takes a lot of innings for it to mean much. It’s possible to have a year-long fluke. So his career average is probably a better indicator of what he’s going to do going forward, but that shouldn’t detract from the nice work he’s done so far.

Michael Young’s defensive limitations haven’t really gone away at third base. It’s better than when he was a shortstop, but it’s still 10+ runs below average. The big limiting factor is his range, which makes sense. Range is the hardest thing to determine with the naked eye. He’s really good at handling all the balls he gets to, and we see that and think of him well. Errors are not a problem for him. What you don’t see is him failing to get to a ball that an average fielder would have been able to reach, and that’s what really hurts him. Having said that, he is still an improvement over the mess of terrible the Rangers ran out to third base last year. Four fielders logged more than 200 innings at third for the 2008 Rangers (Blalock, Chris Davis, Ramon Vazquez, and German Duran), and all were as bad as Young or worse. Sometimes much worse. So bad as he is relativeto the rest of the league, he’s an improvement relative to his teammates.

The final notable improvement is probably going to be the most surprising to the Rangers viewer: Nelson Cruz. You might not know this watching him, but UZR rates him as the best right fielder in the majors at 14.5 runs above average. That’s a bit up from his career average of 11.5, but not insanely so. He really is this good. I know, I was shocked, too. His biggest asset is what we talked about for Young’s liability: range. He might look like he takes funny tacks to the ball, and he might look like a puppy in a thunderstorm settling under a pop-up, but the system indicates he does end up getting to more balls than your average right fielder. Baseball isn’t just about the things you can see from watching it; there’s a lot of stuff guys do to help their teams that you just won’t catch withthe naked eye. The difference between an All-Star hitting .300 and another spare dude hitting .275 is something like four hits a month. Nelson, for example, is hitting .272 so far, and if he had 3 more hits in each monthhe’s played so far, he’d be hitting .308. Now think of how many games you watch in a month, don’t you think he could haveslipped three hits past you without noticing? So without a statistical record such as batting average, you wouldn’t know if he was another guy going along at .272 or a star whizzing to a .308 batting average (Not to say Cruz is just going along, but I think we can agree his offensive value is tied more to his power than his average, but whatever, hopefully you get the point). UZR is like that: it tracks things that help a team that you might not be able to pick up from watching games, even if you watch a ton of them. And one of those things is that Nelson Cruz is a damn good right fielder. Further, when you look at Cruz’s work on the basepaths, you start to think he might be kind of sneaky fast for his size. That would certainly help the range. It makes some kind of sense. Sort of. Now, the right fielders in 2008 weren’t so bad, but no one guy had more than 200 innings (about 20 games worth) at the position. So if Nelson hasn’t done anything else, at least he’s stabilized the position, something that still can’t be said of the other two outfield positions that still largely rotate among Byrd, Murphy, Hamilton, and others.

Finally, Byrd is a better defender in center than Hamilton, so if anything nice came out of Josh’s injury, it was getting Byrd more time in center. Josh is another guy that has problems with range. Josh isn’t terrible, an Byrd isn’t much more than average, but Byrd is definitely better, and his extended innings in center are good for the Rangers’ defense.

So when you get right into the changes made in the Rangers defense, it makes some sense. Installing Elvis and shifting Young was an immediate upgrade at two key spots, Ian is still young and might be getting better or might just be a little lucky, and Nelson Cruz is a sleeper candidate for a gold glove if the people who decided such things ever considered stuff like UZR, which they don’t because they’re old and close-minded.

One thing to keep in mind is that stuff like BABIP, LOB%, and FIP-ERA is only partly defensively-related. The other element is luck. There’s always the chance that the team regresses next year and we see wins more in the low 80’s, rather than the 90-win range this team seems headed for. But then again, you can usually say that about 90-win teams. Stuff just has to go your way to win 90 games.

And one final note: the delightful book Baseball Behind The Numbers (doesn’t that just sound like a book I would like) had a chapter determining if there was any “secret sauce” to playoff baseball, if there was any facets of the game that translated particularly well to October baseball. They found that the quality of one’s closer and one’s defense matter a little more in the postseason than everything else. The logical premise supporting the numbers is that everyone who can get to the playoffs can score runs and have decent starting pitchers, that’s a given or they wouldn’t be in the playoffs. The teams that can prevent runs with their gloves have something not everyone else does. And the teams are evenly matched so the games are tighter, thus bringing the closers to the forefront. The Rangers havehad a bit of instability at closer, so they don’t gain points there relative to teams that can throw out a Papelbon or a Rivera every time they havethings close in the ninth, but the Rangers’ ability to defend puts them in the mix. If they can overcome the Angels or grab the wild card, I think the Rangers defensive improvement makes them a threat to do a little more damage than you might be expecting.

– TC Fleming

PS: The SI article about UZR that is referenced is Here

“It is what it is.”

The Rangers dig the long ball. They hate taking pitches. They are firm believers in pitch equality. They will swing at a fastball, curveball, slider without discriminating. They live by the homer and they die by the lack of it.

If so, bad news lurks for the offense, unless it makes dramatic improvement in offensive approach and offensive efficiency. That news: In parks that aren’t friendly to the home run hitter, the Rangers have been an awful team. And they’ve got more road games remaining in those types of parks than they do in homer-friendly stadiums.

According to this chart on how parks factor in offense, there are 13 stadiums classified as giving advantages to pitchers where home runs are concerned. In 25 games in those stadiums, of which the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum is one, the Rangers are hitting just .204 with a .264 on-base percentage and averaging just 2.96 runs per game. Not surprisingly, they are 8-17.

That is not good news for the Rangers. Of the 34 remaining road games, 18 are played in pitcher-friendly parks, (six at Oakland and Cleveland and three each in Tampa Bay and Seattle). If the Rangers were to stay on their current paces – a .638 home winning percentage, .320 in pitcher-friendly road stadiums and .636 in hitter-friendly road parks – they would end up 89-73. It would be a nice season, but almost certainly wouldn’t result in a playoff appearance.

Their two most recent games have been exercises in futility. They scored twice on Monday without the benefit of an extra-base hit and suffered a 3-2 walkoff loss. They couldn’t manage anything against Gio Gonzalez on Tuesday and fell 6-0. They have now lost five consecutive games in the Bay Area (they were swept in San Francisco in June) and haven’t scored more than four runs in any of them.

That’s why the questions about getting the offense to make some adjustments keep flying at manager Ron Washington.

“The game is about continually adjusting,” Washington said Wednesday. “I hear people talking about how we should work the count and take more pitches, but that doesn’t happen just because you talk about it. Something like that is probably not going to happen at this point in the year. Our personnel is our personnel. They’ve done a pretty good job.  There are nights were we aren’t going to get it done, but usually our guys figure out a way.”

Once again, the Rangers are challenged with trying to figure out how to score when the parks aren’t conducive to home runs. If they don’t, they might just find themselves sitting at home in October for the 10th consecutive season.

The Rangers never would have traded Derek Holland (and if they had, I would have unleashed a criminal flurry of expletives directed at people I actually like).

The only chance Texas had to land Roy Halladay was to convince the Blue Jays that Neftali Feliz was as good, or better. The Rangers know better, but maybe, just maybe, they could convince J.P. Riccardi and his scouting team that Feliz was the bigger talent with the brighter future as many outside of the organization — including both Baseball America and Baseball Prospectus– believe (but not me).

Now, there’s no way.

Derek Holland is still a kid and he’s got a long way to go to get where he has the ability to eventually be — and that’s a no-brainer All Star on an annual basis for years to come — but when you stop for a moment to think about where he’s been and what he’s done already, in such a short amount of time, you realize that there’s really no way to objectively place a ceiling on what he can become.

June 2006: Drafted in the 25th round.
June 2007: Singed and sent to Spokane.
April – June 2008: Low-A Clinton.
July 2008: Bakersfield.
August 2008: Frisco.
April 2009: Oklahoma City.
April 2009: Texas Rangers.

Holland went 7-0 with a 2.40 ERA and an 8.36 K/9 in 17 starts for Clinton. Then he moved on to the extremely hitter-friendly Cal League and was even better, going 3-1 with a 3.19 ERA, and fanning 37 while walking only five in 31 innings of work.

You just don’t see pitching prospects tear through the Cal League like that very often. But it was in Frisco that Holland’s stock really shot through the roof. In four starts against Texas League hitters, Holland had a 0.69 ERA, punched out 29 while walking just six in 26 frames and held the opposition to a .163 batting average. And his fastball started lighting up the Dr. Pepper Ballpark gun at 98 mph.

Think about that? Most kids wear down in their first full season. Holland got stronger. And stronger. And stronger.

But isn’t there an increased risk of injury for a pitcher like that who is asked to take on so much, so fast? Has he been “abused” too much?

People considered experts in developing young pitchers don’t seem to think so in Holland’s case.

When I asked former Rangers pitching coordinator and current Seattle pitching coach Rick Adair what he thought allowed for Holland’s breathtaking ascent through the system last year, he told me:

There’s a lot that goes into that. He was 88-92 when he came to Spokane. We thought maybe he’d turn into a 92-93 mph guy eventually. We certainly never thought we’d see anything like 98.

But everything we did with Derek worked and that’s really a credit to him. He’s got tremendous baseball intelligence. He understood from the very beginning what he was doing. You’d ask him a question and he’d give you a good answer. He understands pitching and his own body extremely well. He’s very consistent not only in his approach to pitching and his preparation, but in his delivery. Every pitch, every game, in every situation, he looks the same.

He worked extremely hard. He’s extremely competitive….. Every now and then, somebody just comes along…. [long pause] Actually, I’ve never seen somebody improve so much, so fast in my time coaching. How do you not get fired up about a guy like that?

When asked by our friend Jason Parks at Baseball Time in Arlington to evaluate Holland’s mechanics, noted pitching mechanics guru Dr. John Bagnozi said that “in the launch phase, he is letter perfect. I can hardly find anything to nit pick about.”

The stuff is special. The offspeed stuff continues to improve. The athleticism is obvious. He’s as competitive as they come and he’s learning more and more about how to pitch. The mechanics are “letter perfect.” He’s given nobody any reason to believe he’s going to do anything but continue to get better and better for years to come.

In spite of his rapid ascent and dramatic increases in workload over the past three years, astute pitching minds like Adair and Bagnozi feel strongly that his mechanics are so clean that he’s a good bet to maintain excellent pitching health.

You don’t trade a player like that. And if you are going to trade one of the few bonafide Aces of a generation like Roy Halladay, you don’t accept anything less.

No deal.